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Abstract
The risk premium is a function of both the interest rate differential and the gap between
the current exchange rate and its long-run equilibrium in a model of the foreign exchange
market with both non-speculating traders and rational speculators. If the speculators have
an alternative to specializing in exchange-rate speculation, then there should be no
presumption that uncovered interest parity will hold even approximately with a long-run
equilibrium number of speculators. Furthermore, when other traders respond to interestrate differentials, the model can give rise to a negative relationship between the interestrate differential and the subsequent change in the exchange rate, a phenomenon that is
often evident in foreign exchange markets.
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DETERMINANTS OF CURRENCY RISK PREMIUMS

.,

One of the most intriguing empirical results in the area of international money and
finance is the phenomenon of forward discount bias. Under the familiar conditions of
uncovered interest parity and rational expectations, the forward premium (that is, the
difference between the forward exchange rate and the current spot rate) should be an
unbiased predictor of future exchange-rate changes. Existing evidence shows, however,
that the actual change in a spot exchange rate is poorly predicted by the forward premium.
In fact, the implied prediction is seriously biased and often has the wrong sign (proot and
Thaler 1990, Engel 1996, Lewis 1995).
Another implication of the joint hypothesis of uncovered interest parity and
rational expectations is that rationally expected excess returns, often referred to as risk
premiums, should be identically zero. As a corollary, the empirically identified forward
bias implies the existence of a non-zero risk premium. Though the existence of forward
bias was identified almost two decades ago, empirical research has not been successful at
reconciling the behavior of risk premiums with existing theoretical models. When
confronted with actual data on risk premiums, the models generally have extremely low
explanatory power, and theoretically important variables are frequently statistically
insignificant.
The relationship between risk premiums and interest differentials is a particularly
puzzling aspect of this mystery.

Many empirical studies have concluded that risk

premiums are strongly related to interest differentials. This is true for studies in which
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the rational expectations assumption justifies the use of realized excess returns as a proxy
for risk premiums (Froot and Thaler 1990, Engel 1996), as well as for studies in which
risk premiums are measured using survey data (Frankel and Chinn 1991, Marston 1997).
However, existing theoretical models almost universally fail to provide an explanation for
the strong observed relationship between risk premiums and interest differentials.
This paper presents a theoretical model of exchange-rate detennination in which
interest differentials are among the primary detenninants of risk premiums. The
multiperiod model incorporates two types of agents: rational speculators, whose currency
demand depends on expected exchange-rate movements; and nonspeculative agents,
whose demand depends on current exchange-rate levels. The model's simple, closedform solution indicates that currency risk premiums should depend on two factors:
interest differentials and the current deviation of the exchange rate from its long-run
equilibrium. Supporting empirical evidence is provided.
Hagiwara and Hierce (1998) also present a model of the foreign exchange market
that connects currency risk premiums and interest differentials.

In their one-period

portfolio balance model, which does not provide a closed-form solution for risk
premiums, exchange rates are driven by a stock equilibrium condition for assets. Models
with these features have consistently been found to be unsuccessful in explaining
exchange rate dynamics. One reason for this empirical lack of success could well be the
models' reliance on the condition of stock equilibrium for detennining exchange rates.
The importance of flow demand and supply for exchange-rate equilibrium has been
established empirically in recent studies of short-term exchange rate dynamics (Lyons
1995; Goodhart and Payne 1996; Evans 1997). Much consistent evidence has also been
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found for U.S. equities markets (Shleifer 1986, Hoithlmsen et al. 1990). In our model,
the utility-maximizing speculators must be satisfied with their portfolio allocations each
period, consistent with portfolio balance models, but exchange rates are determined
according to the condition of flow equilibrium.
Another strength of the model presented here is its focus on exchange-rate
dynamics at relatively short horizons. This focus is embodied in the modeling of the
rational speculative agents, who are intended to represent foreign exchange market
participants such as currency traders and hedge fund managers, whose trading horizons
generally fall well short of a year. These short horizons correspond to those typically
examined in empirical studies of risk premiums, which vary from a week to a year.
Section I of the paper discusses current knowledge about foreign exchange risk
premiums. Section II introduces our model of exchange-rate determination with rational
speculators.

Section III discusses the behavior of risk premiums in the model.

Uncovered Interest Parity would hold only if speculation were infinite, which is not
consistent with long-run equilibrium. If speculation were infinite, expected speculator
utility would be at a global minimum and some speculators would leave the market.
Section IV modifies the model to achieve greater realism. Section V provides evidence
consistent with the model, and Section VI concludes.
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I. FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK PREMIUMS

The Puzzling Behavior of Realized Risk Premiums

I.A.

A foreign exchange risk premium represents the market's anticipated excess
return to holding foreign currency relative to holding domestic currency:
rpt

Here,

St

=tSet+k - St + r *t - rt

(1)

represents the (log) spot exchange rate at time t, measured as domestic currency

units per foreign currency unit; r* t and rt represent foreign and domestic interest rates,
respectively; the superscript "e" denotes an anticipated future value; the prescript "t"
indicates that the anticipations are formed at time t.
Risk premiums should be constant at zero under the strictest verSIOn of the
familiar Uncovered Interest Parity condition, which states that speculative activity should
drive the forward rate to equal the expected future spot exchange rate: fr,t+k
fr,t+k

represents the (log) forward rate at time

t

=tlt+k'

Here,

for contracts maturing at time t+k, and

covered interest parity has been invoked. Under rational expectations, this condition is
further restricted:

fr,t+k

=

Etset+k.

where

E1

indicates expectations formed rationally using

information available as of time t.
The joint hypothesis that Uncovered Interest Parity holds and expectations are
formed rationally has been widely tested and rejected. The standard test begins with the
insight that, under Uncovered Interest Parity alone, the estimated value of A should be
zero and the estimated value of B should be unity in the following regression:
Il t+k - S

1

= A + Bdl + <P1+k
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where

dt

=ft.t+k - St represents the forWard premium on foreign currency or, equivalently

given covered interest parity,

dt

represents the interest differential,

de

= rt -

r*t.

The final

term, <p" represents a mean-zero random disturbance.
Under rational expectations, the realized and expected future spot exchange rates
differ by a mean zero, unpredictable noise term. In this case, one can estimate a modified
version of equation (2) in which the expected exchange rate change is replaced by the
actual change:
St+k - St

Here,

K e represents

=ex + ~dt + Kt+k .

(2)

a mean zero random disturbance that can be interpreted as the sum of

<p" above, and the period-t expectational error. Under the null, the estimated values of ex

and ~ should be zero and unity, respectively.
Froot and Thaler (1990) and Engel (1996) discuss evidence that the estimates of ~
are often negative. In fact, estimates of

~

are typically closer to minus one than to plus

one, unless, as shown by Flood and Taylor (1996), the interest differentials are very large.
This puzzling evidence is frequently referred to as "forward discount bias" and, as
discussed by Isard (1995, p. 142), "economists do not yet fully understand" it.
From the empirical failure of this joint hypothesis we can infer that there are
predictable, nonzero excess returns to foreign exchange speculation. Empirical evidence
has provided two other important insights into the behavior of these excess returns. First,
they vary substantially over time. In fact, as shown by Fama (1984) and Hodrick and
Srivastava (1986), if one assumes rational expectations, one must conclude from the
empirical evidence that risk premiums are more variable than expected exchange rate
changes. Second, the excess returns are strongly related to interest rate differentials.
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Below, we develop a rational expectations model consistent with these findings.
In particular, the model generates endogenous, variable risk premiums strongly related to
interest rate differentials across countries.

I.B.

Survey Evidence
One potential source of predictable excess returns in the foreign exchange market

would be imperfect rationality of exchange rate expectations.

Some evidence exists,

provided by Froot and Frankel (1989) and others, supporting the hypothesis that such
expectations are not fully rational. Using survey data of exchange rate expectations, they
estimate the standard expression for Uncovered Interest Parity, equation (2). Consistent
with Uncovered Interest Parity, and inconsistent with rational expectations, they find that
B is usually close to one. In this case the risk premium is captured by the variable A.
They find that A differs significantly from zero, and that it varies substantially across
time.

Thus Froot and Frankel's evidence suggests that risk premiums are large and

variable even if one abandons the hypothesis of rational expectations. Further evidence,
provided by Frankel and Chinn (1991) and Marston (1997) shows that risk premiums are
strongly related to interest differentials.
McCallum (1994) voices concerns about these results that no doubt reflect others'
reactions as well. He writes (pp. 122-123): "Many researchers will be reluctant to accept
the Froot-Frankel argument. ... Even if one is willing to contemplate the abandonment of
expectational rationality, he/she may be highly dubious regarding this particular form of
irrationality, especially since no psychologically appealing rationale is provided by its
proponents."
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. I.C.

Time-Varying Risk Premiums
If irrationality is not the source of the predictable, time-varying risk premiums,

then we should be able to understand them through economic theory.

Given Fama's

conclusion that risk premiums vary substantially if expectations are indeed formed
rationally, it is reassuring to note that standard equilibrium asset-pricing models imply
that the risk premium should vary across time. In the Capital Asset Pricing Model, for
example, the risk premium should depend on the risk-free rate prevailing at time t, the
return on an appropriate market portfolio from period t through

t+ 1

expected at time t,

and the conditional covariance between returns to speculating on the spot market and
returns to the market portfolio divided by the variance of the returns to the market
portfolio (Hodrick 1987).
As noted by Froot and Thaler, if these are the only determinants of risk premiums
then it is difficult to explain their behavior during certain periods. In the early 1980s, for
example, when U.S. interest rates were relatively high, this risk premium interpretation
would require that "dollar-denominated assets were perceived to be much riskier than
assets denominated in other currencies." .However, this was "exactly the opposite of the
'safe haven' hypothesis which was frequently offered at that time as an explanation for
the dollar's strength." Thus, they conclude that it "is hard to see how one could rely on
the risk-premium interpretation alone to explain the dollar of the 1980's."
Lewis (1995) presents a related model that can address this criticism by
broadening the potential determinants of risk premiums. In her model, the risk premium
depends on risk aversion, portfolio holdings of domestic and foreign assets at home and

8

abroad, the conditional variance of the exchange rate, and the covariances between
exchange rates and domestic and foreign inflation. In discussing a similar framework,
Engel (1996) comments that the variance of prices is generally dwarfed by the variance of
the exchange rate itself. In this case, as Lewis (1995, pp. 1926-7) notes, "the sign of the
risk premium would depend on the difference between ... domestic holdings of foreign
bonds and foreign holdings of domestic bonds. When domestic residents are net creditors
... then the overall effect on the risk premium is to compensate domestic investors for net
holdings of foreign deposits." The model presented below builds on this insight.
Lewis (1995) calculates risk premiums for the Deutschmark, Yen and Pound
against the dollar and finds not only substantial variations but also relatively frequent
switches in sign. She then asks why this model does not seem to explain the foreign
exchange risk premium, and gives two reasons. First, based on estimates by Engel and
Rodrigues (1989), the conditional variance of the exchange rate varies far less than would
be needed to explain variations in the risk premium. Second, the risk premium appears to
switch sign much more frequently than countries switch between overall creditor and
debtor status. Her interpretation (p. 1928) is "[T]he infrequent shifts between net debtor
and creditor positions and the lack of variability in conditional variances suggest this
model cannot explain the changes in sign in predictable returns either."
There may be an important mismatch between the time horizons of the risk
premiums typically examined in empirical work and the time horizons of much of the
international capital movements associated with overall national net asset positions.
Short-horizon risk premiums are probably of greatest concern to those with
correspondingly short trading horizons, such as currency traders, hedge fund managers,
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and the managers of mutual fund portfolios (who are typically re-evaluated at quarterly
intervals). Other international capital flows, such as those associated with syndicated
bank loans and direct investment, may not be significantly affected by short-term risk
premiums. In this case, the low frequency of shifts in countries' overall net creditor and
debtor positions may not be relevant for short-term risk premiums.

II. EXCHANGE·RATE DETERMINATION WITH RATIONAL SPECULATORS

In this section we present a model of the foreign exchange market in which shortterm currency risk premiums are determined primarily by agents operating with short
horizons. In the following sections, we show that the model's endogenous, time-varying
risk premiums depend on interest differentials and that they are unlikely to be competed
away. The model imposes flow equilibrium in the foreign exchange market, in common
with Driskill and McCafferty (1980), among others. It shares with many models the
property that exchange rates ultimately converge to their long-run equilibrium.

II.A. The Model
The rational, utility-maximizing speculators in this model are agents who exploit
expected short-run exchange-rate changes to make profits. These agents typically devote
all their working time to this activity, operating from dealing rooms of large banks or
other financial institutions. Their ranks would include not only foreign exchange dealers
but managers of internationally invested institutional investment funds, such as mutual
funds, hedge funds, and pension funds. They are extensively trained and they closely
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monitor market developments in an effort to assess the likely future direction of exchange
rates. Since their performance is evaluated at least once per year, and more frequently in
many cases, their speculative horizons will be correspondingly short..
To earn profits a speculator takes a position of size hI> measured in units of
foreign currency. The profits on this position will be proportional to the change in (the
log of) the exchange rate, st+J - SI> minus the short-term interest differential across
countries:
(3)

In common with many microstructure models, we

assum~

that speculators choose

positions to maximize the following welfare function
(4)

where 8 is a measure of risk aversion. Et(1tt+I) denotes the expected level and Vart(1tt+l)
the conditional variance of a speculator's profits with information as of time t.

This is

equivalent to maximizing the expected value of a constant absolute risk aversion utility
function when the exchange rate has a conditional normal distribution.
The speculators' optimal bet will be proportional to expected profits and inversely
proportional to risk aversion and risk itself:
ht =q [Et(St+l) - St - dt]

= q rpt

(5)

where
q

=1/8 Var(st+l) .

(6)

Var(St+l) is the expected variance of the exchange rate conditional on information at time

t. As shown by Carlson and Osler (1999), if exogenous influences on the conditional

variance of the exchange rate are constant then Var(st+l) is also constant. This is assumed
here.

When the expected return on foreign assets exceeds that on domestic assets, and

.-
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the risk prerruum is positive, speculators take a long position in foreign currency.
Conversely, speculators will take a short position when the risk premium is negative.
In equilibrium, the exchange rate adjusts so that total net demand for foreign

currency equals zero. Net demand from speculators will correspond to the change in their
aggregate desired foreign currency position.

If there are N speculators, this can be

written:
(7)

where the symbol Q == Nq will be useful later.
Net foreign currency demand from nonspeculative agents is assumed to depend on
the level of the exchange rate:

FX r = Cr - 5 Sr

,

5>0.

(8)

The assumption that 5 is positive, which will be maintained hereafter, corresponds to the
assumption that net foreign exchange demand from nonspeculative agents satisfies the
Marshall-Lerner-Robinson condition familiar from international trade theory.
We take "nonspeculative" currency demand to include all traditional current
account activities, including trade in goods and services, transfers of investment income,
and both public and private unilateral transfers. We also take it to include foreign direct
investment, because empirical evidence suggests that exchange rate levels are a major
influence on direct investment (Ray 1989, Froot and Stein 1991, Blonigen 1997).
With this definition of nonspeculative currency demand in mind, the term Cr can
be taken as summarizing the influence of all factors other than the exchange rate that
might affect this net demand, including goods and services prices, real incomes, barriers
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to trade, and political factors.

For now we assume that interest rates do not affect

nonspeculative demand, an admittedly unrealistic assumption that is relaxed later.
Setting net foreign currency demand from speculators equal to net demand from
nonspeculative agents, the equilibrium condition determining the exchange rate becomes:
(9)

Note that this expression embodies the assumption that exchange rates adjust to achieve
flow equilibrium in the foreign exchange market. As noted in the introduCtion, reliance
on a flow equilibrium condition is consistent with mounting evidence of the effect of
flow demand and supply on both exchange rates and U.S. stocks. Investors in this model
are always in utility-maximizing stock equilibrium, in contrast to ad hoc capital flows in
the Mundell-Fleming model.

II.B. Equilibrium
Assuming rational

expectations,

the exchange-rate equilibrium condition

becomes:
E,s,+! - (1 + SIQ)s/ - E,_!s, + s/_!

=- C,IQ + 1:1/

(10)

where 1:1/ == d, - d,_! represents the change in the interest differential.! The bubble-free
solution, derived in the appendix, is:
~

s/

=A s/_! + (I-A) I,)J(E,C/+

j

-).,E,_.C,+)I S

j=O

(11)

I

This expression is derived by substituting from (5) and (7) into (9) and collecting terms.
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where A is the smaller root of the associated characteristic equation: A2 - (2+SIQ)A + 1 =
0. Note that

°< A< 1, lim A=0, J).,/JQ> 0, and
.

Q-40

lim A = 1.

QIS-4~

Equation (11) states that the current exchange rate depends on its own lagged
value, on expected future values of Cz, representing the primary determinants of
nonspeculative demand, and on expected future values of /)." the change in the interest
differential. To derive more substantive results we must be more specific about the
behavior of C, and /).17 which are the system's two sources of randomness.
With regard to C" suppose this component of nonspeculative currency demand is
subject to i.i.d. mean-zero shocks denoted by £t: C,= C + £,.2 In this case,
E,Ct+)

=

C for j

= 1,2,3, ...

(12)

Define s == C IS as the exchange-rate's equilibrium level in the absence of speculators,
established by setting net nonspeculative demand, FXz, equal to zero in equation (8). As
we will show later, this will also be the exchange-rate's long-run level in the presence of
speculators.
With regard to interest rate differentials, we assume these are mean-reverting,
consistent with evidence provided by McCallum (1994) and others.

Specifically, we

assume:
d,

where

=P d,_) + ll,·

(13)

°< p < 1 and ll, represents a mean zero, i.i.d. shock.
With these assumptions regarding the behavior of C, and /)., (or equivalently, C,

and d,), the solution for the exchange rate becomes (see the appendix for details):
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)

St+l

= -S

-

+ A(St - s) + (I-A)

Et+l -

A

1- PA

A (1- p)
'Ylt+l+
'I

dt

1- PA

.

(14)

The first tenn on the right-hand side of this expression shows that one important
exchange rate determinant is its equilibrium value in the absence of speculators,

S. The

second tenn on the right shows that, in the absence of other influences, the exchange rate
will converge to S monotonically, eliminating the fraction I-A of any discrepancy
between sand steach period. Since the remaining three exchange rate determinants
(Et+l, 11t+l;

and d t ) all have a central tendency of zero, the exchange rate in this model will

tend in the long run towards s = C IS even in the presence of speculators.
The fourth tenn on the right-hand side of (14) shows that the exchange rate is
directly influenced by any change in the interest rate differential: not surprisingly, a rise
in foreign interest rates (a negative

11t+I)

has the immediate effect of appreciating the

foreign currency. The current shock to nonspeculative demand also influences the current
exchange rate, as does the previous period's interest differential. To understand why the
coefficient on the latter is positive, keep in mind that, with mean reversion, a high current
interest-rate differential means declining differentials over the future.

This, in tum,

implies that speculators will be planning concurrent decreases in their holdings of foreign
exchange. The effect is stronger when mean reversion occurs more rapidly (when p is
smaller).
The introduction of speculators transfonns exchange-rate determination. In the
absence of speculation the exchange rate would always satisfy

St

= CiS.

Interest

All the conclusions of the paper are unchanged if we assume, instead, that C, is subject to permanent as
well as transitory influences. The appendix derives the results for this more general case.

2

15
differentials would have no effect on exchange rates whatsoever.

In the presence of

speculators, both the level and the change in interest differentials affect current exchange
rates. In the absence of speculators, any nonzero value for the shock to non-speculative
demand, £t, would be immediately and fully reflected in the current exchange rate and
would have no impact thereafter. By contrast, when speculators are present, the exchange
rate's immediate response to an £-shock is reduced substantially, and £-shocks affect all
future exchange rates.
The influence of speculators can be summarized by the variable A. Since A is
monotonically related to Q

=Nq =N/SVar(s), which in tum can be viewed as a measure

of average speculative activity, we can take A as a measure of average speculative activity
so long as other exogenous variables, such as risk aversion and the statistical distributions
of the shocks, remain constant. This implies that increasing the activity of speculators
reduces the initial effect of an £-shock and lengthens the exchange-rate's convergence
towards its long-run equilibrium. Increasing their activity also intensifies the exchange
rate's response to the change in interest differentials and to past differentials. (See
Carlson and Osler 1999 for further elaboration of these points.)

III. RISK PREMIUMS IN LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM

This section examines the behavior of risk premiums in the model. In the first
subsection we show that the risk premium is determined endogenously, that it varies
across time, and that it is determined in part by interest differentials, all of which is
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consistent with existing empirical results. In the second subsection, we show that risk
premiums are unlikely to be driven to zero by competition among market participants.

III.A. The Risk Premium
To begin, note that the expected change in the exchange rate at time

t

can be

derived from equation (14) as:
EtSt+l - St

where

A __
I-'

= (1-1..) (s - St) + Bdt

(15)

A (l-p),< I.' The risk premium then takes the form:
I-pA

rpt

=

(1-A)(s -

St)

+ (B-1) d t

(16)

So long as A falls short of unity, the model predicts that the risk premium,
measured here as the expected excess return to foreign currency, varies over time and is
determined by two factors: the gap between current and long-run exchange rates (which
we will call the "exchange-rate gap," for convenience), and the interest differential.
The reason that risk premiums are determined by the gap between current and
long-run exchange rates is best understood through a simple example.

Suppose that

interest differentials are fixed at zero, and that the exchange rate is below its long-run
value.

This induces speculators to take a long position in foreign currency.

The

exchange-rate risk associated with that position is compensated by the expected
appreciation of the foreign currency. The expected compensation, the risk premium, is
equal to (1-1..) times the current exchange-rate gap.
The importance of portfolio allocations for risk also explains the relationship
between risk premiums and interest differentials. Once again, a scenario will help clarify
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the intuition involved. Suppose dollar interest rates rise relative to interest rates on assets
in other currencies, as they did in the early 1980s. The attempt to buy dollar assets and
sell foreign assets bids up the value of the dollar. As foreign speculators obtain more
dollar assets, their positions as denominated in their own currencies are subject to greater
potential variation in value. If they are risk averse, these speculators limit their exposure
even though they could earn an excess return by increasing still more their dollar
holdings. The expected excess return (risk premium) on dollars compensates speculators
for their increased exposures to dollar-denoniinated assets.
This analysis shows that riskiness, as measured by the risk premium in this model,
does not arise exclusively from exchange-rate volatility; it also depends on the size of
speculative positions, consistent with the Lewis (1995) specification discussed above, and
with standard portfolio balance models (Branson 1977).

This interpretation of the

dollar's behavior during the early 1980s provides a reconciliation of the "safe haven"
hypothesis cited by Froot and Thaler (1990) with the risk premium hypothesis for the
failure of Uncovered Interest Parity. The causation runs from interest differentials to
speculative positions to risk premiums, rather than the other way. (See Goodhart (1988)
and Carlson (1998) for further discussion of this view.)
The analysis is not undermined by the fact that overall, national net creditor and
debtor positions vary little over time compared with the variability of risk premiums,
cited by Lewis (1995). This is because risk premiums in this model are determined by the
net foreign exchange exposure of a subset of capital account agents, specifically those
with very short speculative horizons. These agents' views about the relative attractiveness
of different currencies are known to swing widely over short horizons. In consequence,
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these agents' net creditor position could likewise change dramatically over relatively
short periods.

III.B. Long-Run Equilibrium
If speculation were extremely active (and A close to unity), risk premiums would

be approximately constant at zero, and the model would conform approximately to
Uncovered Interest Parity. However, foreign exchange speculation is naturally limited by
competition from other markets, so A will almost certainly fall short of unity in long-run
equilibrium. We model this point explicitly below.
The number of speculators, N, should depend on whether foreign exchange
speculation appears to be a better business than other speculative activities. We use
unconditional expected welfare, E(W/), as a measure of the desirability of being in this
market. This measure will be compared with W*, an exogenous parameter representing
expected welfare from being in other markets. 3

If E(W/) is greater than W*, then

additional speculators have an incentive to enter the foreign exchange market, and vice
versa.
We choose to model the participation choice with respect to unconditional
expected welfare to enhance the correspondence of our model with the reality of foreign
exchange markets, where short-term trading is dominated by interbank traders. Those
who manage dealing rooms decide whether to have dealers in this market, and how many.
These managers hire and train the dealers and usually keep them for a matter of years.
For these reasons, decisions about the extent of participation in foreign exchange markets

3

This is a construct that has also been used by Osler (1998).
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are made on a low frequency basis, while a single period in the model corresponds to
medium- or high-frequency exchange rate dynamics.
As shown in the appendix, unconditional expected welfare can be expressed as
follows:
(1- A)3
E(Wt )

= 28(1 + A)

var(e)
(1 + pA)
var(T])
[ var(v) + (1- pA)3 (1- p2) var(v)].

(17)

Thus, unconditional expected welfare depends on A, p, Var(E), and Var(l1). Through A,
which is endogenous, welfare also depends on the number of speculators, N, and their
risk aversion, e.
The implications of (17) for the long-run level of speculative activity are not
immediately obvious because the relationship between unconditional welfare and A, or
equivalently between unconditional welfare and the amount of speculative activity, is not
generally monotonic. However, the first differential of (17) with respect to A indicates
that there will always be some A* above which unconditional expected welfare declines
monotonically with further increases in speculative activity.

Further, as evident in

equation (17), unconditional expected welfare becomes arbitrarily small for large values
of A. Thus, in long-run equilibrium, when E(Wt )

= W*, there is an amount of speculation

beyond which there is no incentive for additional speculators to enter the foreign
exchange market. Thus long-run equilibrium speculation is finite, and equilibrium values
of A are bounded away from unity. In short, in this model there is no presumption that
Uncovered Interest Parity will hold even approximately.
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IV. AN EXTENSION OF. THE MODEL

In this section we modify the model to allow nonspeculative activity to depend on

interest rate levels. Import demand seems likely to be negatively affected by higher
domestic interest rates and export demand negatively affected by higher foreign interest
rates, with corresponding effects on currency demands. In this case, risk premiums still
depend on interest differentials, but the direction of their effect can be either positive or
negative.
More specifically, we modify the expression for net nonspeculative foreign
currency demand to the following:

where I represents the se.nsitivity of these flows to interest-rate differentials.

When

foreign interest rates rise, for example, foreign importers presumably reduce their demand
for domestic goods, and net demand for foreign currency rises.
As shown in the appendix, the solution for the exchange rate now takes the form:

St+1

= -S

+

1(
I\,

-)

8t - S

1)

+ (1-/I.

Ct+1 -

+

A (l-p)-(1/S)p(I-A)2
dt
I-pA

A + (1 - A)(1 / S)
I-pA

11t+1 .

(19)

[ A (1- p) - (1 / S) p(1- A) 2 _ 1] d
t
I-pA

(20)

The foreign exchange risk premium is now:

rpt

= ( 1-/1.1)(s-

-

St

)

+
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If

I

S

,
. negatIve
. ,m equatIOn
,
> A (1- p)2 ' the coeff'1C1ent
on th'
e mterest d'f:l"
1 lerentla1 d t IS
p(1-A)

.

(19) and less than minus one in equation (20). In this case, the foreign currency will tend
to appreciate when the foreign interest rate exceeds the domestic rate, and vice versa
(other things equal). To satisfy this condition, the interest sensitivity of net demand must
be high relative to the exchange-rate sensitivity of net demand.

V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

The risk premiums in the model presented above should be determined by interest
differentials and by the gap between current and long-run exchange rates, as shown in
equation (20). To estimate this it would be appropriate to run the following regression:
(21)
where the subscript m refers to the model developed here and

rpr,

for purposes of

estimation, will be the actual excess return. This expression is closely related to the
standard risk premium regression model,
rpt

= as + \jf sdt + St

(22)

where the subscript s stands for the standard regression equation, Existing evidence
based on this equation suggests that risk premiums and interest differentials are often
negatively related, with coefficients less than minus one,
We reproduce the standard evidence in Tables 1A and 1B, which examine risk
premiums at the 3-, 6-, and 12-month horizons for five currencies relative to the U.S,
dollar: the Deutschemark, the Japanese yen, the U.K. pound, the Swiss franc, and the
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Canadian dollar. The monthly data cover January, 1970 through August, 1998. The risk
premiums are calculated as the actual exchange-rate change (log difference) minus the
maturity-adjusted, continuous-time interest rate differential. Euromarket rates are used
for the relevant interest rates, since these are most closely comparable across countries.
To ensure that the samples were non-overlapping, we use only January, April, July, and
October data for the 3-month regressions. For the six-month regressions we use only
.

January and July data. For the annual regressions we use only January data.

4

As shown in Table lA, when equation (22) is estimated using OLS the 15
estimated values of \If s are consistently negative and greater than unity in absolute value.
With two exceptions, all the estimates are significant at the 5 percent level. Frankel and
Chinn (1991) note that OLS estimates can likely be improved by using the Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions (SUR) technique, which takes into account the likely existence of
nonzero correlation in the error terms across countries. We provide such results in Table
IE. The overall conclusion that interest differentials are significantly and negatively
related to risk premiums is sustained.
Though it might seem that these results are consistent with the extended version
of our model, in which nonspeculative currency demand is interest sensitive, the model
presented here suggests that equation (22) is mis-specified.

In particular, the model

indicates that the exchange-rate gap variable is missing from equation (22), and,

In

consequence, the estimated values for \If s could be biased estimates of the true \If m·

4 All variables were taken as month averages because this was the only option for the price data used in later
regressions.
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To develop an empirical risk premium model consistent with the theoretical
model presented above, it is necessary to develop a measure of the gap between current
and long-run equilibrium exchange rates. For this we turn to simple purchasing power
parity, since this is possibly the only standard model of long-run exchange-rates with any
empirical reliability. Using data from January, 1970 through August, 1998, we regress
the log of the exchange rate level between currency A and currency B on log producer
price indexes for both countries. All the price coefficients have the expected sign and are
statistically significant. Residuals from these regressions serve as exchange-rate gaps in
the risk premium regressions.
Regressions of equation (21), reported in Table 2A, have adjusted R2s which
average around 0.15, fairly high values by the standards of excess returns data at this
frequency.5 Further, the estimated coefficients are fully consistent with the model, which
implies that

am should be positive but less than one and that 'If m could be either positive

or negative.
The coefficients on the exchange-rate gap,

am,

which are roughly analogous to

simple Error Correction Model (ECM) coefficients for the purchasing power parity
regression, all have the theoretically expected, positive sign. The magnitudes of these
coefficients are also reasonable, since they suggest that between 10 and 40 percent of a
given year's exchange-rate gap is closed during the following year. The fact that these
coefficients rise monotonically with maturity suggests that a simple ECM-type
adjustment mechanism is a reasonable characterization of the actual process by which
exchange rates adjust to inflation differentials.
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All 15 of the coefficients on interest differentials,

\jf m,

are negative, and all but

two are significant at the 5-percent level. Further, all of them fall below minus one,
indicating that the relationship between forward premiums are negatively related to
rationally expected exchange-rate changes, consistent with the more standard risk
premium regressions presented in Table 1.
Though most of the exchange-rate gap coefficients in Table 2A are not
statistically significant, this is not surprising given the shortness of the sample, and does
not necessarily undermine the theory. The available evidence for purchasing power parity
supports the hypothesis, on balance, but strong statistical support is generally limited to
samples that are very large, either across time or across countries. In support of this,
consider the results presented in Table 2B. Here, the purchasing power parity regressions
and the risk premium regressions were all accomplished using SUR, which effectively
increases the sample size. With this estimation technique we find that 12 of the 15
exchange-rate gap coefficients are statistically significant.
The use of SUR does not change the regressions' qualitative implications: the
coefficients on exchange-rate gaps remain negative, have reasonable magnitudes, and
increase with the maturity horizon of the risk premium.

Further, almost all the

coefficients on interest-rate differentials remain statistically significant, and all of them
fall below minus one. Overall, these statistical results support the model's implication
that risk premiums vary endogenously, and that they are strongly related to interest
differentials and exchange-rate gaps.

5

A constant was included in each regression.

25
I. CONCLUSION

This paper presents a theoretical exchange rate model with rational speculators in
which the risk premium varies endogenously.

Risk premiums are determined, in

particular, by interest differentials and by the gap between current and long-run
equilibrium exchange rates. These two determinants affect speculators' positions, which
in tum affect the implied relative riskiness of the marginal purchases of domestic and
foreign assets. The paper also provides empirical evidence supporting the model.
Though exchange rates in this model would be consistent with Uncovered Interest
Parity if speculation were infinite, infinite speculation is not consistent with long-run
equilibrium. The expected utility of being a speculator becomes arbitrarily small when
there is sufficient speculative activity in the market. Since speculators can always shift to
other markets, in the long run there will be a finite equilibrium number of foreignexchange speculators. In short, there is no a priori presumption that Uncovered Interest
Parity holds even approximately in long-run foreign-exchange market equilibrium.
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Table lA: Econometric Estimates of the Standard Risk Premium Equation.
All equations estimated with OLS.
The table shows econometric estimates of the following equation:
rpt = as + '" sdt + ~t
where rpt is the risk premium, d t is the interest differential, and ~ t is a random disturbance. Interest rates
were calculated using euromarket interest rates of the appropriate maturity. Data span the period January,
1970-August, 1998.

Country
Japan
Interest differential
Adj R-Squared
Germany
Interest differential
Adj R-Squared

3-Month

6-Month

12-Month

-4.401 ***
0.191

-3.764***
0.232

-3.958***
0.394

-1.547**
0.029

-1.626*
0.040

-1.343
0.039

-2.384***
0.102

-2.512**
0.154

-2.161 ***
0.212

-2.011 **
0.216

-2.108***
0.100

-1.907**
0.130

UK
Interest differential
-2.166***
Adj R-Squared
0.072
Canada
Interest differential
-2.090***
Adj R-Squared
0.137
Switzerland
! ._Interest differential t
-2.234***
Adj R-Squared
0.083
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
\
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Table lB. Econometric Estimates of the Standard Risk Premium Equation.
All equations estimated simultaneously using SUR.
The table shows econometric estimates of the following equation:
rpr = as + 'If stir + ~r
where rpr is the risk premium, dr is the interest differential, and ~ r is a random disturbance. Interest rates
were calculated using euromarket interest rates of the appropriate maturity. Data span the period January,
1970-August, 1998.

Country
Japan
Interest differential
Adi R-Squared
Germany
Interest differential
Adi R-Squared

3-MoIith

6-Month

l2-Month

-4.700***
0.191

-4.118***
0.230

-3.812***
0.394

-1.892***
0.024

-1.368**
0.035

-1.272*
0.006

-2.779***
0.135

-2.890***
0.181

-2.481 ***
0.207

7'2.339***
0.208

-1.445***
0.063

-1.396**
0.084

UK
Interest differential
-3.038***
Adj R-Squared
0.100
Canada
Interest differential
-2.507***
Adi R-Squared
0.131
Switzerland
Interest differential
-2.115***
0.066
Adi R-Squared.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2A: Econometric Estimates of the Model With Long-Run Exchange Rates
Determined by PPP. All regressions using OLS.
The table shows econometric estimates of the following equation:
rp, = a.n(

s -

Sf) + 'II md, + v,

where rp, is the risk premium, (S - Sf) represents the gap between the long-run equilibrium exchange rate
( S ) and the current exchange rate, d, is the interest differential, and v, is a random disturbance.
Long-run equilibrium exchange rates are fitted values from the following regressions:
s, = ~o + ~lP, + ~7P*, + v"
where p, and p*, represent (log) domestic and foreign price levels, respectively, and v, represents a random
disturbance. Interest rates were calculated using euromarket interest rates of the appropriate maturity. Data
span January, 1970-August, 1998.

Country
Japan
XRGap
Interest differential
Adj R-Squared
Germany
XRGap
Interest differential
Adj R-Squared

3-Month

6-Month

12-Month

0.034
-4.439***
0.185

0.139
-3.859***
0.240

0.193
-3.843***
0.383

0.044
-1.543**
0.030

0.143
-1.685*
0.062

0.215
-1.383
0.036

0.215**
-2.413***
0.184

0.371 **
-2.278**
0.278

0.050
-2.342***
0.197

0.197
-2.412**
0.199

0.114
-2.239***
0.113

0.226
-2.012**
0.147

UK
XRGap
0.081 **
Interest differential
-2.093***
Adj R-Squared
0.099
Canada
XRGap
0.029
Interest differential
-2.278***
Adj R-Squared
0.130
Switzerland
XRGap
0.040
Interest differential
-2.293***
Adj R-Squared
0.084
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2b. Econometric Estimates of the Model With Long-Run Exchange Rates
Determined by PPP. All regressions using SUR.
The table shows econometric estimates of the following equation:

where rp, is the risk premium, ( S - s,) represents the gap between the long-run equilibrium exchange rate
( S ) and the current exchange rate, d, is the interest differential, and v, is a random disturbance.
Long-run equilibrium exchange rates are fitted values from the following regressions:
s, = 130 + 131P, + 132P*, + vr,
where Pr and P*r represent (log) domestic and foreign price levels, respectively, and v r represents a random
disturbance. Interest rates were calculated using euromarket interest rates of the appropriate maturity. Data
span January, 1970-August, 1998.

Country
Japan
XRGap
Interest differential
Adi R-Squared
Germany
XRGap
Interest differential
Adi R-Squared

3-Month

6-Month

12-Month

0.123***
-4.989***
0.163

0.301 ***
-4.432***
0.208

0.455***
-3.820***
0.353

0.121 ***
-2.290***
-0.004

0.236***
-1.889***
0.042

0.527***
-1.714**
-0.032

XRGap
0.076**
Interest differential
-3.175***
Adj R-Squared
0.129
Canada
XRGap
0.021
Interest differential
-2.643***
Adj R-Squared
0.124
Switzerland
XRGap
0.109***
Interest differential
-2.512***
Adj R-Squared
0.023
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.

0.178**
-3.013***
0.211

0.363***
-3.094***
0.270

0.026
-2.519***
0.192

0.315
-3.056***
0.180

0.219***
-1.939***
0.011

0.480***
-1.830***
-0.006

UK

I
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Appendix
Derivation of the solution for the model
Our model implies the following difference equation:
(AI)

EtSt+1 - (1 + S/Q)St - Bt-Ist + St-I

=- X t

with X t = [e t -Q(dt - dt-I)]/Q
To find the solution, first take expectations of (AI) as of time t-l, and denote by
P the forward operator which increases the date on s but not the date on the expectations
operator E and by L =F I the lag operator that decreases the date on s but does not change
the date of the expectations operator. Then collect terms:
[P2 _ (2 +S/Q)P + 1] LEt_1st

=- Et-IXt

By factorization:
(A2)

1
(F - A)(F - A) LEt-1st =- Et-IX t

where A is the smaller root of the characteristic equation: A2 - (2+S/Q)A + 1 = 0.
Multiply (A2) through by -A/(1-AP) and expand to get:
~

(A.3)

E1_1s t

= AsH + ALAj EHX/+ j + K).,-t
j=O

where K is an arbitrary constant. With the assumption of no explosive bubbles, K
When (A3), with K

= 0,

is used to substitute in (AI) for Et-IS l and, with a suitable

change in the time index, for EtSt+l, the resulting expression after collecting terms is:

(A.4)

Prom the factorization, the sum of the roots can be written A +..!...

A

(A5)

l-A+~= (1-A)
Q
A

and
(A6)

A
(1-).,)

= 0.

_ (I-A) Q
S

=2 + ~

Q

and so:

34
From (A.5) and (A.6)
(A.?)

- - I ----S
(I-A +-)

= (I-A) ~
"

Q

Multiply both sides of (A.4) by (A.?), and note that (1-AiQ/s

=A, to get

or substituting for X t = [C t - Q~dt ]/Q, and noting again that Q/S = A/(1-A)2 ,
~

j
St = A St-I + (1-A) LA (EtC/+ j - AEt_1Ct+) / S
j=O

(A.8)

A

~

,

- --LAJ(Et~dt+j -AEt_l~dt+j)
1- A j=O
Assume that C t is subject to both permanent and transitory shocks, as postulated by Muth
-

(1960). In that case E t Ct+j = E t Ct+1 for j = 2,3, ... Define St = E t Ct+dS and let £t = [C t EtCt+d/S be the perceived transitory shock to net liquidity demand. The summation
involving C terms can then be written
~

(A.9)

j
(I-A) LA (EtCt+j - AEt_1C/+) / S = [(1-A) C t + A EtCt+1 - A Et_ICt]/S
j=O

-

-

= St - ASt-1 + (1-A) £t
Since we have assumed that d t = pdt-l + 111> note that
d t - d t-I = (p-I)d t_1 + 11t ,
E t-I (dt - dt-I) = (p-1)d t-r ,
E t (dt+j - dt-I+j) = (p-I)pj-I d t = (p-1)(pj d t-I + pj-I 11t)
Et-I (dt+j - d t-I+j) = (p-1)pj d t-I
With these substitutions and using (A9) in (A.8), the solution becomes:
(A. 10)

St - St=A(St-1 - St-I)+(1-A)£t-

Expected Welfare
Conditional expected welfare is given as:

A

1- PA

11t+

A (1- p)
1- PA

dt-l.
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(All)
The profitability of position b t is:
(A. 12)

1tt+1

=b t [St+1 - St - d t].

The position itself is given by
(A 13)

where q

1
= eYar(s)

The risk premium rpt is defined by
with d t =rt - r*to

(AI4)

The unanticipated change in the exchange rate takes the form:
(AI5)

Vt+1

=(I-A.) Ct+1 -

A
I-pA

11t+1

Therefore
(AI6)

=EtSt+1 + Vt+1

St+1

and
2

(AI?)

=(I-A.i var(c) + (1-ApA)

Var(s)

2

var(11)

= var(v)

The payoff to a rational speculative position, after substituting (A 13), (AI4) and (AI6)
into (AI2) is:
(AI8)
From (A.18), we have
(A.19)
(A.20)

Substituting these into (All) and simplifying yields

(A.21)

W
t

=

(rp,)2
20Var(s)
-

In the model, since E t s t+1 =

S to

the risk premium is given by:
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where

(A.22)

~ = A (1 -

p)
1-pA

Substitute this into (A.21) and take the unconditional expected value:

E(W )

(A.23)

t

= (1- A)2 E{ (~- sr) -

[1/(1- Ap)]dr}2
28Var(s)

The numerator in (A.23) can be written
(A.24)
with

O<p<1.

(A.25)

(A.26)

St -

S

t = I-(St-I -

S

t-I) + Vt +

A (1- p)
1-pA

d t-I
.

2
To evaluate E d t , note from (A.25) that d t can be written in moving average form:

Therefore, assuming independent, mean-zero TJ's:
2

Edt = var(d) =

(A.27)

1
2 var(TJ)
1- p

For the first term in (A.24), the moving average representation for (St (with b

S t) can be written

= A (1- p) ):
1-pA

Therefore:
E(St -

-

S

t)

2

=(1 + I- 2 + I-4 ... )var(v)

2
2 "12 3 "14 2
+ b E[d t-I + FI. d t-2 + FI. dt-3
2
5
+ 2 I- d t-Id t-2 + 2 1- dt-2dt-3 + 21- d t-3d t-4 + ...
4
2
+ 2 1- d t-Id t-3 + 21- d t-2d t-4 + ... ]
2
3
+2b E[I-vt-Id t-I + 1- Vt-2dt-I + 1- Vt-3dt-I + .,.
4
+ 1- 3 Vt-2 d t-2 + 1- Vt-3 d t-2 + ... ]
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= _1_2 {var(v) + b2 [1 +
1- A

1
= -I-A
- 2 {(1-Ai var(E) +

2pA ]var(d) -2b A
A A var(T\) }
1- PA
1- PA 1- P

A2
(1- pA)

A2 (l_p)2 l+pA
+ [ (1- pA)3 1- p2

2

var(TJ)

2A\I-p)
(1- pA)3 ] var(TJ) }

I-A

=- var(E) +
1+A
A?

[(1- pA)(1- p2) + (1- p)2 (1 + pA) - 2A(I- p)(I- p2 )]

(1-A 2 )(1-pA)3(I- p 2)

var(TJ)

I-A

=- var(E) +
1+A
A2 (1- p)[(1- pA)(1 + p) + (1- p)(1 + pA) - 2A(1- p2 )]
(1- A2)(1- pA)3 (1- p2)
var(TJ)
1- A
A2 (1- p)2(1- A)
var(E) +
var(TJ)
1+ A
(1- A2 )(1- pA)3(1- p2)

=- (A.28)

E(st -

S

2

1- A

2A
t) =-,- var(E) +
,
, 3
var(TJ)
1+ A
(1 + A)(1- PA) (1 + p)
2

The foregoing used E dtdt-j

.

A

.

=pl var(d) and E Vt-j dt =- I-pA pl var(TJ).

For the middle tenn in (A.24)
E (St -

-

S

2

_-

=
(A.29)

2

t)d t = E(v t + A Vt-l + A Vt-2 ... bdt-l + Abd t-2 + A bdt-3

A

I-PA

.•. )

dt

(1+ pI... +(pA)2 + ... )var(T\) + bp(l + pI... +(pA)2 + ., .)var(d)

-A(1_p2)+pA,(1_p)
-A(1-p)
, 2
var(d) =
, 2 var(d)
(1- PA)
(1- PA)

_
E (St -

S

-A

t)d t

= (1- PA), 2 (1 + p)

var(TJ)

Note the negative unconditional covariance between the interest rate differential and
deviations in the exchange rate from its long-run level. Higher domestic interest rates
tend to be associated with an appreciated currency.
Putting (A.27), (A.28) and (A.29) into (A.24) and the result into (A.23) yidds:
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28 E(W ) =

(1 .11.)3
1+ A

I

+

=

(1~A)2

(1- pA)2

[

( )
var t:
var(v)
2.11.2

2.11.

-

(1 + .11.)(1- pA)(l + p) (1- pA)(1 + p)

+

1
1- p2

var(11)

]---'---'-'-var(v)

(1- .11.)3 var(t:)
1+ A

var(v)

2
A 2 2.11. (1- p) - 2.11.(1 + .11.)(1- p) + (1 + .11.)(1- pA) var(11)
+(1- ) [
(1+A)(1-PA)3(1- P2 ) · ] var(v)
Therefore

(A.3D)

(1- .11.)3

E(W I )

= 28(1+.11.)

var(t:)
(1 + pA)
var(11)
[ var(v) + (1-pA)3(1- p 2) var(v)]

Interest Rates and Non-Speculating Traders
To include non-speculating traders who respond to interest-rate differences, write
the net demand as:

In this case XI has the term -(I/Q)dl and the right side of (A.9) has the added expression:

_ _ 1- A

-

(

!... [P(1- A) d

)S

1- PA

+
I-I

1

1- PA 11

]

1

Add this to the right side of (A. 10) to get the equation (19) in the text.
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